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COMMENT
Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc.: Locking
Out Prostitution
Introduction
With increasing frequency, state and local governments are using
civil penalties to control illegal sex-related businesses,1 including prosti-
tution and the sale of obscene literature.2 Some commentators have ar-
gued that civil statutes or ordinances are more effective than criminal
sanctions.3 One significant approach has been to use nuisance abatement
laws.' Generally, these laws apply one of two types of penalties: either
the general business license of the offending establishment is revoked, or
the business is closed ("padlocked") pursuant to a temporary or perma-
nent injunction.'
When prostitution alone is the nuisance abated by either a license or
padlock law, free speech considerations logically do not arise because
prostitution involves illegal conduct not connected in any way with the
1. Note, Pornography, Padlocks, and Prior Restraints: The Constitutional Limits of the
Nuisance Power, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1478, 1478 (1983). See also O'Connor, The Nuisance
Abatement Law as a Solution to New York City's Problem of Illegal Sex Related Businesses in
the Mid-Town Area, 46 FORDHAM L. REv. 57, 59 (1977).
2. See O'Connor, supra note 1, at 58 n.4. The guidelines for defining obscenity are set
forth in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). The basic Miller guidelines are as follows:
"(a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find
that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, (b) whether the work depicts
or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable
state law, and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value." Id. at 24 (citations omitted). See also Pope v. Illinois, 107 S. Ct. 1918
(1987). In that case, the Court clarified the Miller test, requiring application of the "reason-
able person" standard rather than the "community" standard. Id. at 1921.
3. Note, supra note 1, at 1478. See also O'Connor, supra note 1, at 61-69. For example,
even if the police and prosecutor are successful in arresting and prosecuting a particular prosti-
tute who works in a house of prostitution, her house colleagues and the managers, owners, and
agents would still be operating a viable prostitution business. Id. Under certain nuisance stat-
utes, however, the premises could be closed down. See infra note 5 and accompanying text.
4. See generally Note, supra note 1.
5. City of Paducah v. Investment Entertainment, Inc., 791 F.2d 463, 467 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 316 (1986).
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communication of ideas.6 On the other hand, many licensing and "pad-
lock" laws aimed at controlling the distribution of obscene materials
have been attacked as unconstitutional prior restraints on protected
speech. Lower courts hearing these challenges have reached differing
conclusions.' In 1986, the Sixth Circuit suggested that the Supreme
Court's review of People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc.' would finally
resolve the first amendment issues surrounding licensing and padlock
laws."° The Sixth Circuit was only partially correct.
The statute invoked against Cloud Books, an adult bookstore, was a
padlock law.1' However, bookselling operations were not the target of
the action, and the question of whether the materials sold were obscene
was not at issue. Rather, the District Attorney based his complaint upon
illicit sexual activities that took place on Cloud Books' premises.' 2 In
Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc.,3 the issue before the Supreme Court was
"whether the First Amendment bars enforcement of a statute authoriz-
ing closure of a premises found to be used as a place for prostitution and
lewdness because the premises are also used as an adult bookstore."' 4 A
majority of the Court concluded that it does not. This decision, however,
required the Court to consider and to characterize the relationship be-
tween the illicit sexual conduct and the lawful bookselling activities.
This Comment examines the characterizations put forward by the major-
ity and the dissent within the context of the First Amendment.
6. O'Connor, supra note 1, at 76-77 (citing F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY 240-
41(1976)).
7. See, e.g., Gayety Theatres, Inc. v. City of Miami, 719 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1983)
(holding that local obscenity ordinances using the revocation of licenses and permits are un-
constitutional prior restraints of protected speech); Entertainment Concepts, Inc. v. Maciejew-
ski, 631 F.2d 497 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 919 (1981) (same); Cornflower
Entertainment, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 485 F. Supp. 777 (D. Utah 1980) (same); see also
Universal Amusement Co. v. Vance, 587 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding padlock obscenity
laws invalid); People ex rel. Busch v. Projection Room Theater, 17 Cal. 3d 42, 550 P.2d 600,
130 Cal. Rptr. 328, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976) (same). But see State ex rel. Kidwell v.
U.S. Mktg., Inc., 102 Idaho 451, 631 P.2d 622 (1981) (holding that padlock laws directed at
businesses involved in the sale or exhibition of obscene materials are not prior restraints), cited
in Paducah, 791 F.2d at 468.
8. See supra note 7.
9. 65 N.Y.2d 324, 480 N.E.2d 1089, 491 N.Y.S.2d 307 (1985), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 3172
(1986).
10. See Paducah, 791 F.2d at 471. In Paducah, the Sixth Circuit held that an ordinance
revoking the business licenses of those who had distributed obscene materials was an unconsti-
tutional prior restraint. Id. at 470.
11. See infra note 17 for the text of the statute.
12. People ex reL Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 65 N.Y.2d at 326; 480 N.E.2d at 1091, 491
N.Y.S.2d at 309.
13. 106 S. Ct. 3172 (1986).
14. Id. at 3173.
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I. Background
In Cloud Books, respondents owned and operated an adult book-
store in Kenmore, New York. Sexually explicit books and magazines
were sold on the premises, and several booths showing movies of a sexu-
ally frank nature also were available for patron use.15
In response to reports of illicit sexual activities occurring on respon-
dents' premises, an officer of the local sheriff's department, working un-
dercover, "personally observed instances of masturbation, fondling, and
fellatio by patrons on the premises of the store, all within the observation
of the proprietor. He also observed instances of solicitation of prostitu-
tion, and was himself solicited... by men who offered to perform sexual
acts in exchange for money." 16 As a result of these findings, the District
Attorney filed a civil complaint against respondents seeking closure of
the premises under section 2321 of the New York Public Health Law.7
In their answer to the complaint, the bookstore owners denied hav-
ing any knowledge of sexual activities occurring on their premises. They
further asserted that closure "would impermissibly interfere with their
First Amendment right to sell books on the premises." 8 In New York
Superior Court, the respondents moved for partial summary judgment on
these first amendment grounds,19 but the motion was denied and the first
amendment argument rejected.20 The New York Supreme Court af-
firmed.2 Finally, however, respondents were successful. The New York
Court of Appeals reversed on first amendment grounds.22
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 3173-74. Section 2321 authorizes the District Attorney to institute a suit to
enforce the provisions of § 2329, which provides for the closure of any building found to be a
public health nuisance under § 2320. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2321 (McKinney 1985).
Section 2320 of the New York Public Health Law defines places of prostitution, lewdness, and
assignation as public health nuisances:
1. Whoever shall erect, establish, continue, maintain, use, own, or lease any
building, erection, or place used for the purpose of lewdness, assignation, or prostitu-
tion is guilty of maintaining a nuisance.
2. The building, erection, or place, or the ground itself, in or upon which any
lewdness, assignation, or prostitution is conducted, permitted, or carried on, contin-
ued, or exists, and the furniture, fixtures, musical instruments, and movable property
used in conducting or maintaining such nuisance, are hereby declared to be a nui-
sance and shall be enjoined and abated as hereafter provided.
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2320 (McKinney 1985).
18. Cloud Books, 106 S. Ct. at 3174.
19. Id. Respondents also argued that the "statute was not intended to reach establish-
ments other than houses of prostitution in the traditional sense." Id.
20. People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 119 Misc. 2d 505, 465 N.Y.S.2d 633 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1983).
21. People ax reL Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 101 A.D.2d 163, 475 N.Y.S.2d 173 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1984).
22. People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 65 N.Y.2d 324, 480 N.E.2d 1089, 491
N.Y.S.2d 307 (1985). The Court of Appeals did maintain, however, that the public health law
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A. The New York Court of Appeals Decision
Relying on the principle that bookselling activities are entitled to
first amendment protection,23 the Court of Appeals concluded that re-
spondents' first amendment rights were implicated by the bookstore clo-
sure.2 4 It reached this conclusion notwithstanding the fact that closure
of the store was based on the prostitution and not on the content of the
material sold there. Because it saw the prostitution on bookstore prem-
ises as a combination of expressive and nonexpressive conduct, the court
evaluated the closure statute under the four-part test set forth in United
States v. O'Brien.25 In O'Brien, the Supreme Court held that when
"speech" and "nonspeech" elements are combined "in the same course of
conduct," incidental limitations on first amendment freedoms may be
justified by a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating
the nonspeech element.2 6 Under the O'Brien test,
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified [1] if it is within
the constitutional power of the Government; [2] if it furthers an
important or substantial governmental interest; [3] if the govern-
mental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression;
and [4] if the incidental restriction ... is no greater than is essential
to the furtherance of that interest.
27
Applying the O'Brien test to the New York statute, the Court of
Appeals found that the first three parts of the test were satisfied:
A statute aimed at the abatement of a public nuisance is cer-
tainly within the police power of the State .... [R]estriction of the
conduct alleged ... furthers an important governmental interest
[since] [p]rostitution is criminal activity no matter where it oc-
curs .... [Finally,] the interest in restricting this conduct is clearly
unrelated to the suppression of free expression.2 8
However, the court reversed, holding that the statute failed part
in question applied to establishments other than traditional houses of prostitution. Id. at 329-
30, 480 N.E.2d at 1093-94, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 311-12. See supra note 19.
23. Cloud Books, 65 N.Y.2d at 332, 480 N.E.2d at 1095, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 313 (citing
Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150 (1959)). In Smith, the Court found unconstitutional a
city ordinance which held a bookstore owner criminally liable for the mere possession in his
store of materials later adjudged to be obscene, regardless of whether he had knowledge of
their contents. Smith, 361 U.S. at 155.
24. People ex reL Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 65 N.Y.2d at 334-35, 480 N.E.2d at 1096-
97, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 313.
25. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). In O'Brien, the Court considered the first amendment implica-
tions of applying a statute imposing criminal sanctions for the knowing destruction of a draft
card to the petitioner who had destroyed his card to express opposition to the draft.
26. Id. at 376-77.
27. Id. at 377.
28. People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 65 N.Y.2d at 336, 480 N.E.2d at 1098-99,
491 N.Y.S.2d at 316-17 (citations omitted).
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four of the O'Brien test. 29 The District Attorney had failed to demon-
strate that less restrictive relief "would be insufficient to abate the nui-
sance." 3° The District Attorney then sought, and the United States
Supreme Court granted, certiorari.31
II. The Majority's Analysis
The United States Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Chief
Justice Burger, rejected the Court of Appeals' reasoning.32 The Court
declared that civil penalties are not automatically subject to first amend-
ment "least restrictive means" scrutiny simply because they will have
some effect on the first amendment activities of those subjected to the
penalties.33 Rather, one of two alternate requirements must be met:
either the conduct must have an expressive element, or the burden im-
posed by the statute must fall disproportionately on persons engaged in
protected first amendment activities.34
A. The Conduct Must Have an Expressive Element
In Cloud Books, the Supreme Court did not review the New York
court's "least restrictive means" analysis because the majority concluded
that O'Brien was inapposite to the facts in Cloud Books. The Court as-
serted that O'Brien has no relevance to a statute directed at imposing
sanctions on activities that are completely nonexpressive:35 "The peti-
tioners in O'Brien had, as respondents here do not, at least the semblance
of expressive activity in their claim that the otherwise unlawful burning
of a draft card was to 'carry a message' of the actor's opposition to the
draft."36 Because the illegal conduct in O'Brien-the draft card burn-
ing-legitimately could be construed as the protected expression of a
political opinion, first amendment scrutiny was appropriate.37 The Court
29. Id. at 337, 480 N.E.2d at 1099, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 317. See supra note 27 and accompa-
nying text.
30. People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 65 N.Y.2d at 337, 480 N.E.2d at 1099,491
N.Y.S.2d at 317.
31. 474 U.S. 978 (1985) (grant of certiorari).
32. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 3172 (1986).
33. Id. at 3177. Apparently, the Court would apply this view to criminal as well as civil
sanctions. Id.
34. Id. at 3177-78.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 3175 (emphasis added).
37. After setting forth and then applying the four-part test, the O'Brien Court determined
that the statute prohibiting the destruction or mutilation of draft cards was valid. 391 U.S.
367, 382 (1968).
The Court in Cloud Books also cited two other cases in which it had applied the O'Brien
test to governmental regulation of conduct that had an expressive element. Cloud Books, 106
S. Ct. at 3176. In Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984), the
Court upheld a ban on sleeping and camping in Washington, D.C. parks as applied to demon-
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distinguished the illegal conduct in O'Brien from the illicit sexual activi-
ties involved in Cloud Books. These activities, the Court maintained, ex-
hibited absolutely no element of protected expression.38 Declaring that
"[F]irst [A]mendment values may not be invoked by merely linking the
words 'sex' and 'books',"39 the Court concluded that any burden on re-
spondents' bookselling activities was irrelevant to the statute's validity.
Hence, first amendment scrutiny was not required.40
B. The Statute Must Impose a Disproportionate Burden on Parties
Engaged in Protected Expression
Citing Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner
of Revenue,4 the Court noted that it had applied first amendment scru-
tiny to some statutes "which, although directed at activity with no ex-
pressive component, imposed a disproportionate burden upon those
engaged in protected First Amendment activities."'4 In Minneapolis
Star, the Court struck down a tax imposed on the sale of large quantities
of ink and newsprint. Although the tax was imposed on a nonexpressive
activity, "the burden of the tax inevitably fell.., almost exclusively...
upon the shoulders of newspapers exercising the constitutionally pro-
tected freedom of the press."43
The Court then factually distinguished Cloud Books from Minneap-
olis Star. The New York statute did not have the effect of singling out
bookstores to shoulder its burden as the tax in Minneapolis Star had sin-
gled out newspapers. 4 If the prohibited conduct occurred, closure
would result regardless of the nature of the premises.
In the Cloud Books majority's view, the relationship between the
illicit sexual activities and the lawful bookselling activities would be bet-
ter described as a non-relationship. Civil penalties are subject to scrutiny
only when the legal sanction affects conduct that also has a significant
expressive element, or when a statute based on a nonexpressive activity
has the effect of singling out those engaged in expressive activity.45 Since
strators who were there to protest the plight of the nation's homeless. In United States v.
Albertini, 472 U.S. 675 (1985), the Court upheld the conviction of a protester who had re-
entered a military base after being barred for previous improper conduct. In both cases, "[the
Court] considered the expressive element of the conduct regulated and upheld the regulations
as constitutionally permissible." Cloud Books, 106 S. Ct. at 3176. These two cases are relevant
to the majority's discussion in Cloud Books, not because of their results, but because in both
cases the illegal conduct was considered to have an "expressive" element.
38. Cloud Books, 106 S. Ct. at 3176-77.
39. Id. at 3177.
40. See id. at 3178.
41. 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
42. Cloud Books, 106 S. Ct. at 3176.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 3177.
45. Id. at 3177-78.
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Cloud Books involved neither situation, the Court concluded that the
First Amendment was not implicated by the closure of premises in which
respondents happened to sell books.46
III. The Dissent's Analysis
Justices Blackmun, Brennan and Marshall dissented in Cloud
Books. These Justices rejected the basic premise of the majority opin-
ion-that first amendment scrutiny is required only when the challenged
law regulates conduct with an expressive element or nonexpressive con-
duct that has the effect of disproportionately burdening a particular first
amendment protected activity.47 Writing for the dissent, Justice Black-
mun maintained that historically the Court's "concern clearly has been
to avoid any exercise of governmental power that 'unduly suppress[es]'
First Amendment interests.
48
Arguing that commercial bookstores play an "obvious role ... in
facilitating free expression,"' 49 the dissent stressed that while the pur-
ported intent of the closure statute was to stop illicit sexual activities, the
statute was still subject to first amendment scrutiny because enforcement
of the statute halted lawful, protected book sales as well. "[T]he Court
has said repeatedly that a statute challenged under the First Amendment
'must be tested by its operation and effect.' ,50
The dissent cited several cases in which the Court repeatedly had
struck down statutes that purported to regulate nonspeech, if the statutes
unduly penalized either political or nonpolitical speech."' For example,
in Schneider v. Irvington,52 the Court held invalid several ordinances
which banned the distribution of handbills. These ordinances were in-
tended to curtail littering. 3 The Court in Cantwell v. Connecticut54 in-
validated a statute that prohibited the solicitation of funds for religious
causes unless the cause was approved by the secretary of the public wel-
fare council who would then issue a license.55 The purpose of the statute
was to prevent fraudulent solicitations; however, the Court concluded
46. Id. at 3178.
47. Id. at 3179 n.* (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296, 308 (1940)).
48. Id. (emphasis in original).
49. Id. at 3178 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150
(1959)). See supra note 23.
50. 106 S. Ct. at 3179 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Near v. Minnesota, 238 U.S.
697, 708 (1931)).
51. Id.
52. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
53. See id. at 162. The ordinances under review were from three different cities-Los
Angeles, Milwaukee, and Worcester.
54. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
55. Id. at 301-02.
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that the statute violated the petitioner's freedom of speech and religion. 6
In essence, the Cloud Books dissent argued that first amendment
scrutiny is required when any statute directly or indirectly affects any
activity protected by the First Amendment. In Cloud Books, that activity
was bookselling.
Proceeding from this premise, the dissent then considered the "least
restrictive means" issue as it related to the New York ordinance. The
Justices conceded that "[a] State has a legitimate interest in forbidding
sexual acts committed in public, including in a bookstore." 7 They nev-
ertheless asserted that when a state impairs first amendment activities,
such as bookselling, the state must show that it has chosen the least re-
strictive means of pursuing its legitimate objectives.58 The dissent sug-
gested that the state logically and directly could stop the illegal sexual
activities taking place on the premises of Cloud Books by arresting indi-
vidual offenders. 9 Since the New York statute did not allow for this
approach,6" the dissent maintained that the state had failed to show that
less restrictive measures would not abate the nuisance.61 Accordingly,
the &dissent considered the statute unconstitutional as applied to
respondents.62
This argument essentially paralleled the reasoning of the New York
Court of Appeals.63 However, unlike the New York court, the dissent
moved beyond this "least restrictive means" analysis to what they appar-
ently considered to be the "hidden agenda" of the Cloud Books major-
ity's holding:
The Court's decision creates a loophole through which coun-
ties like Erie, can suppress 'undesirable,' protected speech without
confronting the protections of the First Amendment. Until today,
the Court has required States to confine any book banning to
materials that are determined, through constitutionally approved
procedures, to be obscene.... [However, a] State now can achieve
a sweeping result without any special protection for the First
Amendment interests so long as the predicate conduct-which
could be as innocent as repeated meetings between a man and a
woman-occurs on the premises.64
56. Id. at 303-07. See also Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), which struck down a
statute invoked against a Jehovah's Witness who trespassed on the street of a company-owned
town in order to distribute religious literature.
57. Cloud Books, 106 S. Ct. at 3180 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).





63. See supra notes 23-30 and accompanying text.
64. 106 S. Ct. at 3180 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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In short, the dissent saw censorship and book banning as the real
danger of the Cloud Books decision.
IV. Putting Cloud Books in Perspective
A. Precedent and First Amendment Principles
The dissenters in Cloud Books maintained that the majority decision
departed from precedent and from first amendment principles. However,
the dissent's arguments didnot sufficiently respond to the crux of the
majority's position-that because the illicit sexual activities were in no
way connected with the protected bookselling activities, no first amend-
ment concerns were implicated.
The cases cited by the dissent65 did indeed involve first amendment
scrutiny of statutes that regulated nonspeech or unprotected conduct but
imposed a burden on protected speech. However, none of those cases
contradicts the standard explained and illustrated by the majority.66
Rather, in each of those cases, the "nonspeech" conduct was intimately
connected to the "speech" activity67 and thus could be said to contain an
expressive element.68 The balancing test69 that the Court applied in
Schneider, Cantwell, and Marsh was appropriate because first amend-
ment scrutiny was triggered by nonspeech conduct containing an expres-
sive element. In O'Brien,7 ° first amendment scrutiny was appropriate
because the protected political expression (opposition to the draft) was
not only intimately connected to the unprotected conduct (destroying a
draft card), it was in fact part of the "same course of conduct."'"
The dissent also found authority in Smith v. California72 for the the-
ory that any statute that results in the closure of a bookstore requires
"least restrictive means" analysis.73 This theory, however, resulted from
an overbroad reading of the Smith decision. Unlike the New York stat-
ute in Cloud Books, the statute in Smith was concerned with the content
of the materials sold in the store.
Most importantly, the dissent seemed to view the Cloud Books deci-
sion as a thinly veiled attack, not on the illicit sexual activities, but on the
protected bookselling activities, because of the "adult" and perhaps ob-
65. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
66. See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
67. In Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939), for example, passing out handbills was
the method petitioner chose to express his political views. In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296 (1940), the expression of religious views was directly limited by the licensing statute.
68. See Cloud Books, 106 S. Ct. at 3177 n.3.
69. See id. at 3179 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
70. See supra notes 25, 35-38 and accompanying text.
71. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968); see also supra notes 25-27 and
accompanying text.
72. 361 U.S. 147 (1959). See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
73. See Cloud Books, 106 S. Ct. at 3178, 3180 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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jectionable nature of the materials being sold.74 However, Justice
O'Connor spoke directly to this point in her concurrence:
If, however, a city were to use a nuisance statute as a pretext
for closing down a book store because it sold indecent books or
because of the perceived secondary effects of having a purveyor of
such books in the neighborhood, the case would clearly implicate
First Amendment concerns and require analysis under the appro-
priate First Amendment standard of review.75
There is nothing in the majority opinion or in the dissent to support
the contention that Cloud Books set the stage for book banning at will.
B. Other State Decisions
To support its grant of certiorari in Cloud Books, the Supreme
Court noted that the decision of the New York Court of Appeals con-
flicted with decisions of the Virginia Supreme Court and the Penn-
sylvania Superior Court.76 Those two cases and a third case from
California provide insight into the Cloud Books decision.
In Commonwealth ex rel. Lewis v. Allouwill,77 the Pennsylvania Su-
perior Court affirmed the trial court's injunction padlocking two adult
bookstores for one year because of illicit sexual activities occurring on
the premises. The trial court found that despite arrests in both stores,
the illicit activities had continued.78 The Allouwill court rejected appel-
lants' constitutional challenge to the nuisance statute authorizing the clo-
sure, noting that the illicit sexual activities, not the obscenity of the
materials sold, were the basis for the closures.79 The court also noted that
appellants were allowed to remove their merchandise from the stores and
therefore conceivably could continue to sell their books and magazines
elsewhere.80
A Virginia trial court held in Commonwealth v. Croatan Books,
Inc.81 that defendant's business constituted a public nuisance because of
criminal sexual activities occurring on its premises. But the trial court
also declared that the nuisance statute, which mandated closure, was un-
constitutional as applied because it exceeded the remedy necessary to
abate the nuisance.8" The trial court fashioned its own remedy, ordering
dismantling of the booths where the illicit activities had occurred and
74. See supra text accompanying note 64.
75. Cloud Books, 106 S. Ct. at 3178 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
76. Id. at 3175 n.l.
77. 330 Pa. Super. 32, 478 A.2d 1334 (1984).
78. See id. at 37, 478 A.2d at 1337. Note also that arrest was the solution suggested by
the Cloud Books dissent. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
79. Allouwill, 330 Pa. Super. at 40, 478 A.2d at 1338.
80. Id. at 40, 478 A.2d at 1339.
81. 228 Va. 383, 323 S.E.2d 86 (1984).
82. Id~at 386-87, 323 S.E.2d at 87-88.
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enjoining the bookstore from constructing any similar structures.8 3 The
trial court apparently was unpersuaded by evidence introduced by the
State showing that a prior temporary order 4 had been unsuccessful in
eliminating loitering and solicitation of sexual activities.85 When Croa-
tan Books reached the Virginia Supreme Court, the justices applied the
O'Brien four-part test. 6 The high court accepted the State's argument;
because the less restrictive remedy had failed, closure was a proper exer-
cise of the Commonwealth's police power and satisfied the O'Brien re-
quirement of incidental, permissible infringement on first amendment
freedoms.
8 7
People ex rel. Sorenson v. Randolph,88 a California case, reached a
similar decision. In Randolph, a club that featured various illicit sexual
activities had ignored previous warnings and had continued to allow
lewd conduct on the premises despite a temporary injunction.8 9 Conse-
quently, the court held that closure was not unreasonable. 90
The similar pattern of relationships and behavior in the facts of Al-
louwill, Croatan and Randolph-as well as in Cloud Books- probably
influenced the majority's analysis in Cloud Books. Arguably, when illicit
sexual activities occur outside of traditional houses of prostitution, they
often take place on the premises of adult bookstores.91 And, as the cases
discussed above indicate, arrests and temporary injunctions appear to be
unsuccessful in stopping these activities. Had the Supreme Court agreed
that first amendment scrutiny of the New York nuisance statute was re-
quired because of the statute's effect on respondents' bookselling activi-
ties, similar statutes in other states would be subject to the same scrutiny.
Then, if the pattern of illegal sexual activity suggested by existing case
law were to continue, the states would expend considerable time and re-
sources instituting temporary measures which experience has shown are
often ineffective. By rejecting the proposition that a closure statute
aimed at illicit sexual activities has first amendment implications simply
83. Id at 387, 323 S.E.2d at 88.
84. This order was issued at an initial hearing to determine whether a temporary injunc-
tion should be imposed. The court required that access to two of the four movie booths be
roped off, that any openings between the booths be repaired and that uniformed guards be
hired to prevent loitering and use of the booths by more than one patron at a time. Id. at 387,
323 S.E.2d at 87.
85. Id. at 391, 323 S.E.2d at 90.
86. Id. at 388-89, 323 S.E.2d at 88.
87. Id. at 391, 323 S.E.2d at 90.
88. 99 Cal. App. 3d 183, 160 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1979). The Croatan Books court cited Ran-
dolph in its analysis. See Croatan Books, 228 Va. at 390, 323 S.E.2d at 90.
89. Randolph, 99 Cal. App. 3d at 190, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 72.
90. Id.
91. The Allouwill court stated that it was generally known in Harrisburg that adult book-
stores were places where people could go to have impersonal sexual encounters. Allouwill, 330
Pa. Super. at 41, 478 A.2d at 1339.
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
because the activities take place on the premises of a bookstore, the
Supreme Court has relieved the states of this task.
Conclusion
In City of Paducah v. Investment Entertainment, Inc.,92 the Sixth
Circuit predicted that Cloud Books would settle the issue of padlock laws
and prior restraint.93 However, the Cloud Books decision really only
split the issue. Cloud Books involved a nuisance statute aimed solely at
controlling illicit sexual activities; such a statute implicitly was distin-
guished from one aimed at controlling obscenity.94 When state or local
governments invoke a statute intended to combat illegal sexual conduct,
even against the owner of a bookstore, they are now freed from first
amendment standards of review-as long as the contents of the materials
sold are not at issue, and the statute in question is not a pretext for
censorship.
Of course, censorship is precisely what the dissenters feared would
result from Cloud Books, but the dissent offered little more than general
speculation on this point. The dissent also overlooked the fact that if a
statute prohibits conduct that has an expressive element or is somehow
connected to the materials sold, Cloud Books will not apply. Most likely,
Cloud Books has simply provided state and local governments with one
small, but nevertheless effective, weapon in their ongoing battle against
prostitution and other illicit sexual conduct.
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94. The Court still has not addressed the constitutionality of nuisance laws aimed specifi-
cally at obscenity. In fact, the Court denied certiorari in the Paducah case subsequent to the
Cloud Books decision. City of Paducah v. Investment Entertainment, Inc., 107 S. Ct. 316
(1986) (denial of certiorari). See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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